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* This paper is the English summary version of Okazaki[1999a].Abstract
    This paper examines the function of corporate governance of the zaibatsu holding
companies.  Since 19
th century, or in some cases since 17
th century, zaibatsu
accumulated assets and diversified them into various businesses.  Expansion and
diversification of the businesses caused problems which resulted from asymmetric
information, namely adverse selection and moral hazard of the agents who executed the
businesses.  In order to resolve these problems, zaibatsu introduced organizational
innovation.  By early 1920’s, each zaibatsu established the holding company, while it
separated the businesses into joint-stock companies.
     The holding company of zaibatsu had the organizations and full-time stuffs to
monitor the affiliated companies.  In many cases, the concerning sections of the
holding company, such as the section of audit, inspection etc., checked the budget and
financial data of the affiliated companies, while the matters of the board of directors
were approved by the holding company ex ante and ex post.  There existed systematic
rules on the allocation of powers between the holding company and the affiliated
companies.    Also, the holding company frequently dispatched directors to the affiliated
companies.
     The efficacy of these devices of governance was tested quantitatively.  We
compared ROE between zaibatsu affiliated firms and non-zaibatsu firms, using panel
data of 135 firms from 1922 to 1936.  By controlling the effects of company scale,
industry-specific shocks, and macro-shocks, we obtained the result that zaibatsu-
affiliated firms clearly outperformed the other companies.  This result supports the
hypothesis that the zaibatsu holding company played the role of monitoring the affiliated
companies.
     Besides this governance function concerning the affiliated companies, zaibatsu
also disciplined the non-affiliated companies in the capital market.  The holding
companies and the core affiliated companies frequently executed take over, which
contributed to restructure the targeted companies, thorough replacement of the directors,
assistance of management.2
1. Introduction
     By the revision of the anti-monopoly law in 1997, the holding company, which
had been banned since 1947, came to be legal in Japan.  In the discussion concerning
the revision, prewar zaibatsu was frequently mentioned.  Those who were against the
revision, stressed the revival of zaibatsu, while those who were for it, denied the
possibility of the revival (Subcommittee on Basic Problems, Industrial Structure
Council [1993]).
     It is remarkable that both camps took it for granted that zaibatsu were
monopolistic, which implies that concerning zaibatsu, both camps took the “monopoly
branch” in the Oliver Williamson’s cognitive map of contract (Williamson[1985], p.24).
It is natural, because the postwar dissolution of zaibatsu and legislation of the anti-
monopoly law, which aimed at maintaining the results of the dissolution, were based on
this standpoint.  However, it is not self-evident that the other approach, namely
“efficiency branch,” is not useful for understanding zaibatsu.
          In this paper, we will re-examine the role of zaibatsu in “efficiency” perspectives.
In other words, this paper focuses on the corporate governance function of the zaibatsu
holding company.  Williamson[1975] stressed the role of multi-divisional firm (M-
firm) in corporate governance.  Unlike the naïve assumption of the neoclassical
economics, there usually exists serious information asymmetry between investors in the
capital market and corporate managers, which makes it difficult for the capital market to
discipline corporate managers effectively.  According to Williamson[1975] M-firm
resolves the information asymmetry.  First, the general headquarters of M-firm with
full-time stuffs could intensively monitor the divisions under it.  Second,  it also has
good capability to evaluate the potential value of the non-affiliated companies in the
market.    Thorough, purchase and sale of stocks and corporate take over, M-firm could
effectively discipline non-affiliated as well.
     As is discussed in the following sections, zaibatsu holding companies played the
role of these functions which Williamson[1975] attributed to M-firm.  In this sense,
zaibatsu was an organizational basis for the corporate system in prewar Japan
1.  The
governance function of the internal market of zaibatsu was discussed in Okazaki [1993]
and Okazaki[1999b].    This paper is an extension of these articles
2.
                                                  
1 Williamson [1975] defined the holding company (H-form) as “the divisionalized
enterprise for which the requisite control apparatus has not been provided,” (p.152).
However, as Williamson noted himself, this terminology is somewhat special (p.143).
2 Kikkawa[1996] stressed that zaibatsu confined the power of ownership in double3
     The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly overviews development of
zaibatsu.    Section 3 focuses on the organizational innovations, namely establishment of
the holding company, by zaibatsu.  Section 4 executes quantitative analyses of the
zaibatsu’s governance function to the affiliated companies.  Section 5 examines the
governance function of zaibatsu in the capital market.    Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Accumulation and diversification of assets
     Table 1 shows the shares of zaibatsu, in terms of paid in capital, in 1937, which
was the last year of the prewar period
3.  The Holding Companies Liquidation
Committee (HCLC), which was established for zaibatsu dissolution in 1946, identified
ten major zaibatsu, namely Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sunmitomo, Yasuda, Furukawa, Nissan,
Okura, Nomura, Asano, and Nakajima.. The nine major zaibastu except Nakajima,
4
occupied 15 % of the total paid-in capital in Japan in 1937 (Table 1).
     When United States started occupation of Japan in 1945, the US government
mentioned zaibatsu as “the large industrial and financial combinations which have
dominated a large part of the Japanese commerce and industry” (Ministry of
Finance[1981], p.22).   Table 1 indicates that the US government overvalued the
position of zaibatsu, and at the same time that zaibatsu’s share was not negligible.
Observed by industry, zaibatsu’s shares were relatively high in finance, mining,
manufacturing, shipping and real estate.    On the other hand, they were lower in utility,
land transportation and commerce.
          In order to make clear the position of zaibatsu in large companies, we compiled a
company database.  The data sources are (1)Toyo Keizai Shinposha ed. Kabushiki
Gaisha Nenkan (Joint-stock Company Yearbook), 1937 issue, (2)Osakaya Shoten ed.
Kabushiki Nenkan ( Stock Yearbook), 1938 issue, and (3)HCLC[1951].  Sources (1)
and (2) cover major companies whose stocks were openly traded in the capital market.
On the other hand, they miss those companies whose stocks were held by small number
                                                                                                                                                    
senses.    Namely, the power of the family over the holding company and the power of
the holding company over the affiliated companies were limited (pp.81-93).    This view
is meaningful as a criticism to the traditional view which focuses on the “control” by
zaibatsu, and I myself have stressed that the governance of the affiliated companies by
the zaibatsu holding company, had long-term time horizon (Okazaki[1993]).    However,
the view of Kikkawa[1996] missed the corporate governance issue.
3 Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937.
4 Nakajima formed corporate group in 1940’s.4
of shareholders, which were frequently the case concerning zaibatsu affiliated
companies.    To cover those closed companies, we referred to (3).
     By (1), (2) and (3), 355 private companies whose paid-in capital were over five
million yen in 1937, were identified.  Table 2 shows how many zaibatsu affiliated
companies are in the top 10, 50, 100, 200 and 300 companies, in terms of paid-in capital.
There are 3, 10, 18, 38, and 65 zaibatsu affiliated companies respectively, which means
that approximately one third of the large companies were affiliated to zaibatsu.  The
share is higher than that in Table 1, but we need not change the above evaluation
concerning the position of zaibatsu in the prewar Japanese economy.
     Growth of zaibatsu can be observed by the amount of assets of the holding
companies (Figure 1).    The data of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and Nissan
are available.    The former four zaibatsu expanded rapidly in late 1910’s.    Nissan, one
of the “new zaibatsu,” was formed in 1928, succeeding to the companies of Kuhara
zaibatsu, which was bankrupted in 1920’s.  The rapid expansion in late 1910’s was
mainly due to the boom caused by the World War I, but it was nominal to some extent.
If we measure the scale of each zaibatsu in terms of the ratio of its assets to nominal
GNP, the ratio increased almost steadily from 1880’s to 1930’s (Figure 2).
     In the growing process of zaibatsu, their assets were diversified into various
businesses.    The chronology of diversification of each zaibatsu is summarized in Table
3
-Table 8.  For example, there are 18 Mitsui affiliates in the above data base of 355
companies.  Table 3 shows (1) the year when they were established, and (2) the year
when Mitsui started the business of the companies.  Usually (2) preceded (1).  The
cases in which (1) preceded (2), imply that Mitsui acquired exiting companies.  The
lines are arranged in the order of (2).    The process of diversification can be followed by
those tables.    For saving space, we focus on the cases of Mitsui and Nissan.
     Among Mitsui’s businesses in 1937, finance, originated in 17
th century, was by
far the oldest.  Although the first business of Mitsui was a kimono store, it was
separated from Mitsui in 1904 (Yasuoka[1987]).  When Meiji government was
established in 1860’s, Mitsui, one of the major financiers, was entrusted administration
of the government funds, which came to be a major source of its profit, until Bank of
Japan was established in 1882.  In 1876, Mitsui founded Mitsui Bank, succeeding its
financial business (Yasuoka ed.[1982] pp.87-88).
     Other two major businesses of Mitusi, commerce and mining, were derived from
the financial business in 1870’s.  In 1874, Mitsui started commercial business, which
would result in Mitsui & Co., and set up 27 branches all over Japan.  It was intended5
that expansion of trade would enlarge the exchange business (Mitsui Bunko ed.[1980a]
p.227).  Also in 1870’s, Mitsui acquired several metal mines through foreclosure
(Yasuoka ed.[1982] p.128).  It extended mining business through acquisition of state-
owned Miike Coal Mine, whose products came to be a basis for Mitsui & Co.’s overseas
business (Mitsui Bunko ed.[1980a] p.303).  In this sense, the financial, mining and
commercial business of Mitsui were complementary one another
5.
     In 1880’s, Mitsui entered into manufacturing industries, under the leadership of
Hikojiro Nakamigawa, a vice president of Mitsui Bank (Morikawa[1978] p.66; Yasuoka
ed.[1982] p.144).  His “industrialization policy” was not so successful in terms of
short-run profitability, but several important manufacturing companies, such as
Shibaura Manufacturing (Shibaura Seisakujo), one of the predecessors of Toshiba, and
Onoda Cement, came to be affiliated to Mitsui, owing to the policy
     After the death of Nakamigawa in 1901, Mitsui continued to invest in the
manufacturing industries, based on its mining business.    In 1907, Hokkaido Coal Mine
and Shipping (Hokkaido Tanko Kisen), an affiliated coal mining company, set up Nihon
Steel Works (Nihon Seikojo), jointly with British companies, through which Mitsui
indirectly entered into steel industry (Mitsui Bunko ed.[1980b] pp.176-179).  In 1912,
a chemical plant, utilizing cokes gas, started to work at Miike Mine, which was an
origin of Miike Nitrogen Industry (Miike Chisso Kogyo) and Toyo High Pressure
Industry (Toyo Koatsu Kogyo), established in 1930’s (Yasuoka ed.[1982]).    In 1920’s,
Mitsui entered into life insurance and food industries through acquisition (Mitsui Bunko
ed.[1994] pp.38-39).  Under the prolonged depression, many companies came into
financial distress.  Mitsui, as well as other zaibatsu, acquired those companies.  Its
implication will be discussed in section 5.
          As mentioned above, Nissan zaibatsu was established in 1928, succeeding Kuhara
zaibastu.  In 1920’s Kuhara went into financial distress, due to failure of commodity
speculation.  Fusanosuke Kuhara, the owner of Kuhara zaibatsu, entrusted Gisuke
Ayukawa, his brother in law, to restructure the businesses.  Ayukawa reorganized
Kuhara Mining (Kuhara Kogyo) into Nihon Sangyo as a holding company, and Nihon
Mining (Nihon Kogyo) as a mining company (Udagawa[1984] ).  Nihon Sangyo held
the shares of ex-Kuhara companies, such as Nihon Mining, Hitachi Manufacturing
(Hitachi Seisakujo), and Hitachi Electlicity (Hitachi Denryoku) (Table 8).
     After the reorganization, Nissan rapidly expanded businesses though aggressive
                                                  
5 Zaibatsu played the role of resolving the problem due to complementarity, which was
carried out by MITI’s the industrial policy in the postwar period (Okazaki[1997]).6
M &A.  In 1931, Nissan acquired Datto Automobile Manufacturing (Datto Jidosha
Seizo) to enter into the automobile industry (Nissan Automobile[1965] pp.27-39).  In
1934, Nissan merged a fishery company (Kyodo Fishery, Kyodo Gyogyo) and a
shipbuilding company (Osaka Manufacturing, Osaka Tekkojo), which was then
separated to be a subsidiary of Hitachi Manufacturing (Nihon Fishery[1961] pp.297-
298; Wada[1937] p.200).  In 1937, Dainihon Coal Mining (Dainihon Tanko) under
Nissan was reorganized to be Nihon Chemical Industry (Nihon Kagaku Kogyo) to
merge Dainihon Fertilizer (Dainihon Hiryo) (Nissan Chemical [1969] p.98).
3.ɹ ɹ ɹ ɹOrganizational innovation for governance: establishment of the holding
company
     In general, expansion and diversification of businesses of the company, increase
monitoring costs of the investors.  Growth of zaibatsu, described in the previous
section, caused this problem.  To cope with it, zaibatsu carried out various
countermeasures, the core of which was to set up holding companies, specialized in
monitoring affiliated companies.   From 1900’s to 1920’s, each zaibatsu reorganized
its businesses into joint-stock companies, and established a holding company which
held the shares of those companies
6.
Organization of the holding company
     Mitsui Gomei, the holding company of Mitsui zaibatsu, was established in 1909.
Its purpose was prescribed in the “Business Rules,” as monitoring and coordination of
the affiliated companies.    For this purpose, Mitsui Gomei had the Section of Inspection
(Keisa-ka) and the Department of Finance (Zaimu-bu) (Figure 3).  The Section of
Inspection checked the documents sent by the auditors of the companies, a large part of
whose stocks was held by Mitsui Gomei.    It also inspected the businesses and accounts
of those companies.  The Department of Finance was in charge of finance of Mitsui
Gomei itself and its affiliated companies (Kasuga[1987] pp.27-29).
     Mitsubishi Goshi was established as the headquarters of Mitsubishi zaibatsu in
1893, which managed the businesses by the multidivisional organization.  From late
1910’s to early 1920’s, Mitsubishi Goshi separated its divisions into joint-sock
companies, and came to be the holding company.  Meanwhile, Mitsubishi Goshi
reformed its internal organization to set up four sections, namely, Monitoring (Kanri),
Personal Affairs (Jinji), Industrial Research (Sagyo) and General Affairs (Somu) (Figure
4).
                                                  
6 Okazaki [1999a] describes the process of the organizational reforms more in detail.7
          The Section of Monitoring audited the accounts and businesses of the Mitsubishi
Goshi itself and its core affiliated companies, and it was also in charge of budget,
settlement of accounts and finance of those companies.  In this sense, the Section of
Monitoring was a counterpart of Mistsui’s Section of Inspection and Department of
Finance.    The Section of Personal Affairs was in charge of personal affairs of the core
affiliated companies, as well as Mitsubishi Goshi iteslf (Mishima ed.[1981], pp.88-92).
     Sumitomo set up Sumitomo Sohonten as the headquarters in 1909, succeeding
Sumitomo Honten.  By 1920, Sumitomo reorganized its businesses of finance,
steelmaking and cable manufacturing into Sumitomo Bank (Sumitomo Ginko),
Sumitomo Steel (Sumitomo Seikojo), and Sumitomo Cable Manufacturing (Sumitomo
Densen Seijojo), respectively.  Consequently, Sumitomo Sohonten came to be the
holding company, although it still had various its own businesses.    In 1921, Sumitomo
Sohonten was reorganized into Sumitomo Goshi, and after that, it successively
separated its businesses to be the holding company in the narrow sense.
     In 1928, when most of the Sumitomo’s businesses had been reorganized into
joint-stock companies, the “Company Rules” of Sumitomo Goshi was enacted.
According to the “Company Rules,” four departments, namely, Personal Affairs (Jinji),
Finance (Keiri), General Affairs (Somu), Engineering (Kosaku) were established
(Figure 5).  The Department of Finance checked the budgets and settlements of the
core affiliated companies, and supervised them.    Also, it investigated the new business
frontier.  The Section of Accounting (Kaikei-ka) in the Department of General Affairs
monitored the accounts and cash flows of the core affiliated companies.  The
Department of Personal Affairs, like the case of Mitsubishi, administrated personal
affairs of the core affiliated companies as well as Sumitomo Goshi itself
(Asajima[1983] pp.69-72).
     Yasuda Hozensha was established in 1887 to administrate the shares of the
Yasuda Bank.    However, it was a nominal company without organization and full-time
stuff, and the shares of the affiliated companies were held by Yasuda Bank (Yui[1986]
pp.83-88) .  In 1905, three departments with full-time stuffs were set up in Yasuda
Hozensha.  At the same time, major part of the shares which Yasuda Bank had held,
were transferred to Hozensha.  Consequently, Yasuda Hozensha came to be the
holding company of Yasuda zaibatsu (Yui[1986] pp.255-261, pp.290-291).
    In 1922, one year after Zenjiro Yasuda, the founder of Yasuda zaibatsu, was
assassinated, an organizational reform of Hozensha was carried out, under the
leadership of Toyotaro Yuki, who was invited from Bank of Japan to the top
management of Yasuda zaibatsu.  As a result, Hozensha came to be composed of six8
departments, namely, Secretary (Hisho), General Affairs (Shomu), Finance (Rizai),
Bank (Ginko), Company (Kaisha) and Research (Chosa).  The Department of Bank
was in charge of inspection of the affiliated banks, as well as financial adjustment of
those banks, which reflected the fact that Yasuda zaibatsu concentrated its assets into
the banking sector.  On the other hand, the Department of Company was in charge of
checking the accounts of the affiliated companies, their finance, and inspection of them
(The Editorial Committee of the History of Yasuda Hozensha and Its Relating
Businesses ed.[1974] pp.532-537).
    The organization of Nihon Sangyo was reformed in 1934, when diversification of
businesses had proceeded.  Three department, namely General Affairs (Gyomu),
Monitoring (Kanri), and Business were set up (Figure 6).  The Department of
Monitoring monitored the management of the affiliated companies, and also was in
charge of legal affairs regarding M&A.  Ayukawa compared the Department of
Monitoring to the Board of Audit of Japan (Kaikei Kensain) (Udagawa[1984] pp.53-
54).
Allocation of powers and information system
     In  Mitsui  zaibatsu,  the  core  affiliated  companies  should  have  the  ex ante approval
by Mitsui Gomei to determine the matters of the board of directors.  In other words,
while routine decision makings, other than board of directors matters, were entrusted to
each core affiliated companies, Mitsui Gomei held veto power regarding important
matters.  This  ex ante approval was, at the same time, an information system for Mitsui
Gomei to monitor the core affiliated companies (Kasuga[1987] p.27).
     Dispatching stuffs of the holding company to the affiliated companies was, like
other zaibatsu, a basic tool for monitoring (Okazaki[1999b]).    In Mitsui Gomei case, it
was prescribed in its “Business Rules” that dispatched directors should report the
business of the company to the president of Mitsui Gomei as occasion calls, and,
concerning important matters, rely on his ex ante judgment (Kasuga[1987] p.27).
          Mitsubishi zaibatsu had systematic rules on power allocation between the holding
company and the core affiliated companies, namely (1) ”Rules on the relationship
between the core affiliated companies and Mitsubihi Goshi” (1918), (2) “Internal rules
on the board of directors of the core affiliated companies” (1919, revised in 1922), (3)
“Rules on the fund raising and application of the core affiliated companies” (1918).
Main points of (1) were as follows (Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute [1958]
pp.65-67).
   
a. Directors and auditors of a core affiliated company should be registered at9
Mitsubishi Goshi
b. Rules enacted by Mitsubishi Goshi should apply to the core affiliated companies.
In case a core affiliated company enacts different rules or important rules, approval
by the president of Mitsubishi Goshi is necessary.  All the rules enacted by the
core affiliated companies should reported to Mitsubishi Goshi.
c. Budgets and settlements of a core affiliated company should be approved by the
president of Mitsubishi Goshi.
d. A core affiliated company should send the expected fund flow and expected
profit and loss to Mistubihi Goshi.
e. The Chief of the Section of Audit, Department of General Affairs, should audit
the accounts of the core affiliated companies, according to the order of the
president of Mitsubishi Goshi
7
f. The stuffs of a core affiliated company should be screened and employed by
Mitsubishi Goshi.  The personal affairs of the stuffs above the counselor (sanji)
need approval of the president of Mitsubishi Goshi.  The personal affairs of the
other stuffs should be sent to the president of Mitsubishi Goshi, by way of the
Section of Personal Affairs, the Department of General Affairs, in advance
8
          The rules (2) prescribed that the matters determined by the board of directors of a
core affiliated company, should be approved by the president of the Mitusbihi Goshi
before enforcement.  In case of emergency, they should be approved ex post
(Mishima[1981] p.93).    According to (3), a core affiliated company should concentrate
its operational accounts to the Bank Department of Mitsubishi Goshi
9.  Mitsubishi
Goshi could monitor the operations of a core affiliated company thorough the Bank
Department (Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyujo [1958] pp.63-65; Hagimoto[1995] pp.82-84).
     In Sumitomo zaibatsu, “Sumitomo Family Laws” and “Sumitomo Accounting
Rules” (until 1928) or “Company Rules” (since 1928), prescribed allocation of powers
and information system.    According to “Company Rules,” a core company should send
the “Estimated Accounts” ex ante, and “Report of Actual Accounts” ex post, to
                                                  
7 The Section of Audit, the Department of General Affairs was reorganized into the
Section of Monitoring in 1919.
8 The Section of Personal Affairs, the Department of General Affairs was reorganized
into the Section of Personal Affairs in 1919.
9 The Bank Department of Mitsubishi Goshi was reorganized into Mitsubishi Bank in
1919.10
Sumitomo Goshi every year (Asajima[1983] pp.79-90).
     As to Yasuda’s core affiliated company, the articles of incorporation, important
rules, unroutinized matters of the shareholders meeting and the board of directors,
budget, settlement, disposition of profit and loss, personal affairs etc. should be
consulted with Yasuda Hozensha ex ante.  Also, a core affiliated company should
notify applications to and orders from the public agencies, matters of the shareholders
meeting, matters of the board of directors, personal affairs, balance sheets and its
detailed data, business situation etc (Hashimoto[1992] p.118; Editorial Committee of
the History of Yasuda Hozensha and its Businesses ed.[1974] pp.538-539).
4. Quantitative analysis of profitability
     As described in the previous section, the holding companies of zaibatsu devised
various mechanisms to monitor their affiliated companies.  We can test efficacy of
those mechanisms quantitatively, thorough analysis of profitability.  The sample firms
were selected as follows.
     First, out of the 1937 issue of Osakaya Shoten ed. Kabushiki Nenkan and
HCLC[1951], we picked up all the company whose paid-in capital were over 10 million
yen.  The purpose of using HCLC[1951] was, like the case of section 2, to include
those companies whose stocks were held by small number of shareholders.     
     Second, out of those primary sample firms, we picked up the firms whose
financial data from 1922 to 1936 are available.  The sources of the financial data are
the various issues of Osakaya Shoten ed. Kabushiki Nenkan, and each firm’s business
reports which are included in either of the Yushodo’s microfilm collection of business
reports or of the collection of original business reports at the library of the Faculty of
Economics, the University of Tokyo.  In order to increase sample firms, we included
those firms with a data lacking period of a half year.  Consequently, 135 firms were
picked up, 30 of which were affiliated to zaibatsu
10.
          Distribution of the 135 firms by industry is shown in Table 9.    Many firms of the
capital intensive industries like utility and land transportation, namely railways, are
included.  Next to them are the financial industry and textile industry, which led the
prewar industrialization of Japan.  Comparing the distribution of firms by industry
between zaibatsu group and non-zaibatsu group, we find that there was substantial
                                                  
10 In the sense that each firm of them was affiliated to one of major nine zaibatsu,
namely Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Furukawa, Nissan, Okura and Nomura,
according to HCLC[1951].11
difference (Figure 7).    Zaibatsu affiliated companies relatively concentrated in finance,
mining, metal, machinery, chemical, ceramics, commerce, and real estate and warehouse.
On the other hand, non-zaibatsu companies relatively concentrated in paper, textile,
foods, electlicity, land transportation, and shipping.
     Return on equity (ROE) of each firm is computed by (net profit of each term)/
(paid in capital and retained profit at the end of the term).  The total (non-weighted)
average of ROE in 1922-1936 was 8.9%.    Splitting the samples into three sub-periods,
1922-1926, 1927-1931, 1932-36, we find decline of ROE in the second sub-period,
which was due to the Great Depression in Japan.
          On the other hand, movement of ROE by industry in Table 9 reflects the trend of
the industrial structure in Japan.  First, the light industries such as paper, ceramics,
textile and foods industries, continued to outperformed the average.  Second, the
mining, shipping, and development, real estate and warehouse, continued to fall behind
the average.  Third, the heavy and chemical industries such as metal, machinery and
chemical industries, which at first had fallen behind the average, came to outperform it
in 1930’s.    Fourth, finance and commerce, which had outperformed the average, came
to fall behind it in 1930’s.
     The first group were, so to speak, mature industries, which continued to bring
about rich fruits.  The second group were stagnating industries.  In fact, they
developed earlier than the manufacturing industries in nineteenth century.  The third
group were developing industries, which had started to grow during the World War I,
and came to be the new leading industries in 1930’s.  Meanwhile, the fourth group
were declining industries.
     It is remarkable that the major investment fields of zaibatsu shown in Figure 7,
were the stagnating and declining industries (the third and the fourth groups), and the
developing industries (the second group).  Keeping in mind the process of
diversification described in section 2, we can say that zaibatsu invested the capital,
which had been accumulated in the old industries since nineteenth century, into the
newly developing heavy and chemical industries.
          Average ROE of zaibatsu firms were lower than the total average, except the sub-
period of 1932-36 (Table 10).    However, it is mainly because of the difference of firm
distribution by industry between zaibatsu and non-zaibatsu firms.    If we compare ROE
by industry, zaibatsu firms tend to outperform the average.  Out of 30 comparable
cases concerning the three sub-periods, ROE of zaibatsu firms was higher than the
average in 18 cases.
     In order to compare profitability between zaibatsu and non-zaibatsu firms more12
formally, we regress ROE to (a)paid-in capital (CAPITAL), (b)dummy variable which is
1, if the firm is affiliated to zaibatsu and 0, if otherwise (ZAIBATSU), (c)industry
dummies (INDUSTRY), (d)year dummies (YEAR), and (e)constant.  (a) is for
controlling the scale effect, while (c) is for controlling industry-specific shocks.  And
(d) is for controlling macro-shocks.  Our hypothesis is that the coefficient of
ZAIBATSU is positive, because zaibatsu holding companies intensively monitored the
affiliated companies, using the organization and devices, discussed in the previous
section.    We use panel data of above 135 firms from 1922 to 1936 (2,025 samples).
          Equation (1) of Table 11 was estimated by OLS with the whole samples.    As we
expected, the coefficient of ZAIBATSU is positive and statistically significant at 1%
level.    Furthermore, the magnitude of the zaibatsu effect is substantial.    Because ROE
is measured by %/year, the estimated equation implies that, on average, ROE of a
zaibatsu affiliated firm is 3.651% higher than that of a non-zaibatsu firm, if scale effect,
industry-specific shocks, and macro-shocks are controlled.
          This result is robust, if we split samples into three sub-periods.    Equation (2), (3)
and (4) of Table 12 were estimated by OLS with the samples of 1922-26, 1927-31 and
1932-36, respectively.  In all of the equations, the coefficients of ZAIBATSU are
positive and large in absolute value.    Also, concerning the sub-periods of 1922-26 and
1932-36, they are statistically significant at 1% level.
     Those results support our hypothesis on the governance function of the zaibatsu
holding company.  Concerning this view, there might be a criticism from a standpoint
of the “monopoly approach,” that the high profitability of zaibatsu affiliated companies
reflects the monopoly rents.  However, if the monopoly rents are based on the price
control, it should be distributed across the firms in the same industry, whether they were
affiliated to zaibatsu or not.
     The regression results excluding the industry dummies are also reported in Table
11 and Table 12.  The coefficients of ZAIBATSU are negative in the equations of
1922-36, 1922-26, and 1927-31, although they are not statistically significant.  On the
other hand, in the equation of 1932-36, the coefficient of ZAIBATSU is positive and
statistically significant at 5 % level.  These results can be interpreted to be reflect the
distribution of firms by industry and the strategy of zaibatsu behind it.  As mentioned
above, zaibatsu invested heavily in the declining/stagnating industries and the newly
developing industries.  The strategy of zaibatsu to shift portfolio from the former
industries to the latter, came to be rewarded in 1930’s.
5. Governance function of zaibatsu in the capital market13
     Gisuke Ayukawa, the top of Nissan zaibatsu, wrote in his book on the role of
Nissan zaibatsu as follows (Ayukawa[1937] pp.165-166).
  
The job of Nissan resembles to that of a gardener.    Nissan buys various seeds and
young plants, and grows them by letting them bathe in the sun, and supplying
water and fertilizer.    If flowers and fruits come out, Nissan distributes them to its
shareholders.    Also, if a rare tree or a good plant stagnating in the shade, is found
out, Nissan buys it at a low price to cultivate by changing soils and grooming.
Furthermore, it has a skill of grafting to let plum flowers come out on a peach tree.
Nissan’s function which Ayukawa discussed figuratively, is that of a take over raider
stressed in Williamson[1975].  According to Ayukawa, Nissan found out those firms
of poor performance due to infancy or bad management, and bought them to provide
with financial and technological support and to improve management.  If those firms
came to be profitable, the profit was distributed to the shareholders of Nissan thorough
it.    In some cases, he wrote, Nissan sold the firms to earn capital gains.
     In this section, we check the function which Ayukawa claimed, through case
studies. In order to select cases, we can use Table 3-Table 8 of section 2.    As explained
there,  the cases in which the year when the companies were established, preceded the
year when the zaibatsu started the business, imply that the zaibatsu acquired exiting
companies.  Picking up all of those cases from Table 3-Table 8 and arrange them in
order of the year of acquisition, we have Table 13.  Zaibatsu except Nissan acquired
companies mainly in 1920’s, while Nissan, the “new zaibatsu,” aggressively took M&A
strategy in 1930’s.    In this sense, Ayukawa’s book cited above, is well-grounded.
          Among them, we focus on the four cases which occurred in the period from 1925
to 1933, namely Sumitomo Life Insurance (Sumitomo Seimei), Tokyo Steel (Tokyo
Kozai), Nihon Flour Mill (Nihon Seifun), and NEC (Nihon Denki).  This is for
convenience to rely on the financial database which we used in the previous section.
Sumitomo Life Insurance
     The predecessor of Sumitomo Life Insurance was Hinode Life Insurance, which
was founded in 1907 by Toshiyuki Okamoto, the president of the branch company of a
US. life insurance company.  Hinode Life Insurance fell in the financial distress after
the World War I.  Okamoto asked Denpei Shimogo, the president of Ninju Life
Insurance, to buy the company, and Shimogo family bought it in 1921 (Sumitomo Life
Insurance[1977] pp.11-13).  However, even after the acquisition by Shimogo, the
position of Hinode in the industry was not improved.    The difference of the growth rate14
of insurance contract amount between Hinode and the average of Nihon Life Insurance
(Nihon Seimei) and Teikoku Life Insurance (Teikoku Seimei), the top two companies,
continued to exist (Table 14).
          Meanwhile, Sumitomo Goshi planned to enter into the life insurance industry, on
the ground that it was protected by the government regulation and that it was
complementary with banking and trust industries.  Because of the entry regulation,
Sumitomo intended to acquire an existing company (Sakudo ed.[1982] pp.223-224),
when Shimogo asked Sumitomo Bank to refinance the fund for the acquisition of
Hinode.  Then, Masatsune Ogura, the executive director of Sumitomo Goshi,
instructed the Research Section of Sumitomo Bank to analyze Hinode, and the Research
Section concluded that Sumitomo should acquire it.
     In April 1925, the patriarch of Sumitomo family (Kichizaemon Sumitomo) and
the General Director of Sumitomo Goshi (Kinkichi Nakata) approved to acquire Hinode.
Thorough negotiation between Sumitomo Goshi and Shimogo, all of the Hinode’s
shares held by Shimogo, were bought by Sumitomo Goshi (Hashimoto[1992] pp.126-
127; Sumitomo Life Insurance [1977] pp.14-17).    At the shareholders’ meeting in June
1925, the board of directors of Hinode was completely reorganized (Table 15).  The
Seiichi Kokubu, who had been the main office manager of Sumitomo Bank became the
executive director of Hinode, and eight of ten directors of Hinode came to be the
persons affiliated to Sumitomo.    Only one incumbent director remained at the position.
In May 1926, Hinode was renamed to be Sumitomo Life Insurance (Sumitomo Seimei),
and at the same time it got the position of a core affiliated company of Sumitomo.
     After the acquisition by Sumitomo, Hinode or Sumitomo Life Insurance actively
increased branch offices and developed new insurance commodities, the results of
which was reflected in the growth of insurance contracts.    The growth rate substantially
increased since 1925 to get ahead of Nihon Life Insurance and Teikoku Life Insurance
(Table 14).   In other words, acquisition by Sumitomo was a turning point of Hinode
or Sumitomo Seimei’s position in the industry.
Tokyo Steel
     Tokyo Steel was established in 1917, succeeding to Tokyo Steel Manufacturing
(Tokyo Kozai Seisakujo) founded by an engineer of Kanegafuchi Cotton Spinning
(Kanegafuchi Boseki).  It came to have relation with Mitsubishi zaibastu thorough a
loan of 500 thousand yen from the Bank Department of Mitsubishi Goshi in 1917
(Mitsubishi Steel [1985] pp.81-82).
     In 1919, Tokyo Steel went into deficit, because of the price decline and large
stock of products and raw materials.  Although it tided over this distress owing to the15
support of Mitsubishi Bank, it came to a deadlock in 1925, because of the damage by
the great earthquake in 1923, as well as price decline (Ibid., pp.95-99, p.109; Table 16).
In those days, Tokyo Steel, whose paid-in capital was 2,000,000 yen, owed debt of more
than 2,000,000 yen to Mitsubishi Bank besides 1,400,000 yen to other creditors.  As
some of the creditors other than Mitsubishi Bank tried to seizure assets, Tokyo Steel
was frequently faced with a bankruptcy (Ibid., p.110).
     Under this situation, Koyata Iwasaki, the president of Mitsubishi Bank and
Mitsubishi Goshi instructed Takeo Kato, the executive director Mitsubishi Bank, to
resolve the Tokyo Steel problem.  At Kato’s request, six stuffs of Mitsubishi Iron
Works (Mitsubishi Seitetsu), one of the core affiliated company, investigated into Tokyo
Steel.    They sent the following report to Mitsubishi Bank:
Tokyo Steel will not recover, unless substantial amount of new fund is invested.
However, because its business is indispensable to the industries of Japan, it is a
great loss for our nation to let it bankrupt.  On the other hand, if substantial
amount of new money is invested to make its management go well, it will not go
into deficit in future.
    
     Based on the report, Mitsubishi Bank proposed a rescue loan to Tokyo Steel, on
the condition that the loan should not used for returning the existing debt.    As a result
of negotiation, it was agreed that 20% of the debt from the other creditors would be
repaid with the rescue loan, and that 80% of it would be cut off.
     Mitsubishi Bank did not intend to hold the shares of Tokyo Steel at first.
However, because in the process of the rescue operation, the third party tried to take
over Tokyo Steel, Mitsubishi Bank added as a condition of the rescue loan that more
than half of Tokyo Steel’s share should be negotiated to it in order to secure control of
the company.  Then, Tokyo Steel collected a major part of its share to negotiate
Mitsubishi Bank in 1925 (Ibid, pp.112-118).
     Table 17 compares the composition of the large shareholders between before the
acquisition and after that.    While all of the top ten shareholders were individuals, each
of whom had 1-5% of the shares before the acquisition, 84.3% of the shares were held
by Isaji Endo, who was the chief of the Section of Loan, Mitsubishi Bank, and had been
dispatched to Tokyo Steel as an auditor, in 1928.  In July 1926, the board of directors
was totally reorganized, and all but one directors were occupied by the persons from
Mitsubishi Iron Works.   The Diary of Mitsubishi Goshi wrote, “Mitsubishi Iron
Works took in charge of the management of Tokyo Steel.  All of the executives were16
selected from Mitsubishi Iron Works, and the they started to manage the company in
July 31.” (p.7269)
     Before the transfer of control to Mitsubishi, Tokyo Steel handed documents
concerning its management, including personal affairs, finance and assets etc..    Due to
the acquisition, “the organization, rules and office procedures were reformed, and the
corporate culture was recoated by Mitsubishi color.” (Mitsubishi Steel [1985] pp.119-
121).    After the acquisition, ROE of Tokyo Steel, which had been below the average of
the metal industry, came to be higher than the average.  Although ROE fell in the
depression from 1929 to 1931, it exceeded the average again in 1930’s (Table 16).
Nihon Flour Mill
          Positive effects of the acquisition by zaibatsu on the corporate performance, were
observed more clearly in the case of Nihon Flour Mill (Nihon Seifun).  Nihon Flour
Mill, established in 1896, was a major company of the flour industry, as well as Nisshin
Flour Mill (Nisshin Seifun).  In early 1920’s, Nihon Flour Mill came to have relation
with Suzuki Shoten, a major trading company which rapidly grew during the World War
I.    It became more and more dependent on Suzuki, as its financial condition got worse
(Nihon Flour Mill[1987] pp.37-42).    In 1922, Suzuki came to be a top shareholder with
13.1% of the shares (Table 18).
     In 1920’s, ROE of Nihon Flour was around 10%, but it was relatively low in the
foods industry.  Also, it was lower than the rival company, Nisshin Flour Mill (Table
19).    Furthermore, failure of wheat speculation in 1924, gave a damage to Nihon Flour
Mill.    To cope with the situation, it made a merger contract with Nisshin Flour Mill in
October 1926, but just after that, Nisshin refused to merge, on the ground that Nihon
Flour Mill’s  debt were larger than expected.  Failure of merger was evaluated as a
bad news by the financial market.  The stock price of Nihon Flour Mill fell from 54.0
yen in October 1926 to 13.4 yen in January 1927.    Also, it came to be difficult for the
bills of Nihon Flour Mill to be discounted (Ibid., pp.43-44; Toyo Keizai Shinposha
[1928] p.44).
     Due to Suzuki’s movement, Taiwan Bank, a public bank which had intimate
relation with Suzuki, provided with a rescue loan.    Then, Nihon Flour Mill reduced the
three quarters of the capital to clear the deficit, and increased the capital again to replace
the debt from Suzuki.  By this operation, Suzuki’s share of stocks increased to 72.8%
(Table 17).    At the same time, Komakichi Kubota, the chief of Suzuki’s Tokyo branch
was installed as the president of Nihon Flour Mill, and besides it, two directors were
dispatched from Suzuki and Taiwan Bank (Nihon Flour Mill[1987] p.45).    Nihon Flour
Mill started to restructure itself under the control of Suzuki and Taiwan Bank.17
          However, just after that, by the financial crisis in 1927, Suzuki and Taiwan Bank
bankrupted, and the reconstruction scheme of Nihon Flour Mill collapsed.  To cope
with it, Nihon Flour Mill asked assistance to Mitsui & Co. (Mitsui Bussan), to which it
had trade connection.  In March 1928, a new board of directors was installed, with
Yunosuke Yasukawa, the executive director of Mitsui & Co. as the chairman.    Five of
the seven directors were affiliated to Mitsui & Co., including Yasukawa, the chairman
and Toichi Nakamura, the executive director.  At the same time, the shares of Nihon
Flour Mill held by Taiwan Bank, were bought by Mitsui & Co. at the price of 25 yen per
share.    Consequently, Mitusi & Co. came to be a dominant shareholder with more than
60% of shares (Ibid., pp.46-49; Table 18,20).
     Under the control of Mitusi & Co., Nihon Flour Mill reformed its organization,
concentrating powers to the headquarters, which came to be control procurement,
marketing and finance of the whole company.  Also, the headquarters’ system of
monitoring branches was reinforces (Ibid., pp.49-50).  After the acquisition by Mitsui
& Co., the performance of Nihon Flour Mill was sharply improved.  In 1929, ROE
went beyond the average of the foods industry, and in 1932 it surpassed that of Nisshin
Flour Mill (Table 18).    Also, the stock price rose substantially.    If we use 76.3 yen of
1935 as a benchmark, it is calibrated the 48,000 shares which Mistui & Co. had bought
in 1928, brought about capital gains of 2,460,000 yen.
NEC
     NEC (Nihon Denki) was establised by two Japanese engineers jointly with
Westinghouse in 1899.  Westinghouse held 54 % of NEC shares, which were
transferred to International Western Electric (IWE), established by Westinghouse to
administrate its affiliated companies abroad in 1918.    In 1920, NEC and Westinghouse
tied up with Sumitomo Cable Manufacturing (Sumitomo Densen Seizojo) to transfer the
patent of the telephone cable.  NEC acquired 25% of Sumitomo Cable’s shares, and
Sumitomo Cable, in turn, acquired 5% of NEC’s shares.  Also, NEC and
Westinghouse dispatched directors to Sumitomo Cable, while Kinkichi Nakata, a
director of Sumitomo Goshi, was installed as a director of NEC (NEC[1972] p.107).
Consequently, NEC came to be connected with Sumitomo zaibatsu.    In 1925, IWE was
acquired by International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) to be International Standard
Electric (ISE).
     In late 1920’s, the tightening policy of the government gave a damage to NEC,
which relied on the public procurement of telephone equipment.  Furthermore, the
“buy Japanese” policy was disadvantageous to NEC, more than half of whose shares
were held by a foreign company.  To cope with it, ITT and ISE intended to entrust18
NEC to a Japanese company.  In 1932, ISE and Sumitomo Goshi made a contract as
follows.  ISE and Sumitomo Goshi exchanged 36,064 shares of NEC and Sumitomo
Cable each other.    Sumitomo Goshi participated in the management of NEC with ISE.
Sumitomo Goshi held the power to appoint NEC’s top management.    Also, it bore the
final responsibility of management policy of NEC, which is continuously notified to ISE
(NEC[1972] p.157).
     Consequently, the share of ISE fell below 50%, while that of Sumitomo Goshi
and Sumitomo Cable rose to 14% (Table 21).  At the same time, Sumitomo Goshi
appointed Takesaburo Akiyama, its executive director, as the chairman of NEC, and
Fumio Shida, the chief engineer of Sumitomo Cable, as the executive director of NEC
(NEC[1972] pp.159-160).
     After Sumitomo acquired the control of NEC in 1932, its performance was
improved.  On the other hand, unlike the three above cases, the relative level of ROE
compared with the average of electric machinery industry, did not rise (Table 22).
However, it is not a counterexample of zaibatsu’s governance function for the following
reason.
     The special condition concerning NEC was a joint-venture with a foreign
company.    Since 1926, ISE dispatched three directors to NEC, two of whom resided in
Tokyo.  Personal affairs of the directors should be approved by ISE ex ante.  The
matters beyond the certain scope should be consulted with ISE ex ante.  ISE executed
budget control, and American accountants monthly audited its accounts (NEC[1972]
pp.141-142).    In other words, NEC had already been intensively monitored by ISE, the
company specialized in monitoring affiliated companies abroad, before it came to be
monitored by Sumitomo.  In this sense, it is natural that the relative level of ROE
compared with the average of electric machinery industry, did not rise after 1932.
6. Concluding remarks
     S i n c e  1 9
th century, or in some cases since 17
th century, zaibatsu accumulated
assets and diversified them into various businesses.  Expansion and diversification of
the businesses caused problems which resulted from asymmetric information, namely
adverse selection and moral hazard of the agents who executed the businesses.  In
order to resolve these problems, zaibatsu introduced organizational innovation.  By
early 1920’s, each zaibatsu established the holding company, while it separated the
businesses into joint-stock companies.
     The holding company of zaibatsu had the organizations and full-time stuffs to
monitor the affiliated companies.  In many cases, the concerning sections of the19
holding company, such as the section of audit, inspection etc., checked the budget and
financial data of the affiliated companies, while the matters of the board of directors
were approved by the holding company ex ante and ex post.   There  existed  systematic
rules on the allocation of powers between the holding company and the affiliated
companies.    Also, the holding company frequently dispatched directors to the affiliated
companies.
     The efficacy of these devices of governance was tested quantitatively.  We
compared ROE between zaibatsu affiliated firms and non-zaibatsu firms, using panel
data of 135 firms from 1922 to 1936.  By controlling the effects of company scale,
industry-specific shocks, and macro-shocks, we obtained the result that zaibatsu-
affiliated firms clearly outperformed the other companies.  This result supports the
hypothesis that the zaibatsu holding company played the role of monitoring the affiliated
companies.
     Besides this governance function concerning the affiliated companies, zaibatsu
also disciplined the non-affiliated companies in the capital market.  As the above case
studies indicate, the holding companies and the core affiliated companies frequently
executed take over, which contributed to restructure the targeted companies, thorough
replacement of the directors, assistance of management.20
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呯瑡 呯瑡氠潦⁴桥
湩湥⁺慩扡瑳
䵩瑳畩䵩瑳畢楳 卵浩瑯浯 奡獵摡 䙵牵歡睡 乩獳慮 佫畲 乯浵牡 䅳慮
浩汬楯渠祥
呯瑡 ㄷⰶ㔵 ㄵ⸰ ㌮ ㌮ ㈮ ㄮ 〮 ㈮ 〮 〮 ㄮ
䙩湡湣 ㄬ㘴 ㈵⸳ 㐮 㜮 ㌮ 㠮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮
䉡湫 ㄬ㐱 ㈱⸷ 㐮 㐮 ㌮ 㠮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮
呲畳 㜴 㐳⸶ ㄰⸱ ㄰⸱ 㘮 ㄰⸱ 〮 〮 〮 㘮 〮
䥮獵牡湣 ㄴ 㔰⸴ ㈮ ㌸⸷ ㈮ 㘮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮
䵩湩湧 ㄬ㐵 ㌵⸵ ㄱ⸲ 㜮 ㈮ 〮 ㄮ ㄱ⸲ ㄮ 〮 ㄮ
䵡湵晡捴畲楮 㘬〴 ㄸ⸲ ㌮ ㌮ ㈮ 〮 〮 ㌮ 〮 〮 ㈮
䡥慶礠慮搠捨敭楣慬 ㌬㘱 ㈰⸶ ㌮ 㐮 ㌮ 〮 ㄮ 㐮 〮 〮 ㄮ
䵥瑡 㤱 ㄴ⸶ ㄮ ㄮ 㘮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮 㐮
䵡捨楮敲 ㄬ㌱ ㈷⸲ ㌮ 㠮 ㌮ 〮 ㌮ 㔮 ㄮ 〮 ㄮ
䍨敭楣慬 ㄬ㌸ ㄸ⸳ 㔮 ㈮ ㈮ 〮 〮 㘮 〮 〮 〮
䱩杨 ㈬㐳 ㄴ⸶ ㌮ ㈮ ㄮ 〮 〮 ㈮ 〮 〮 ㌮
偡灥 ㌴ 㔮 〮 ㈮ 〮 ㈮ 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮
䍥牡浩捳 ㈹ 㐶⸶ 㠮 ㄱ⸱ ㄮ 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮 ㈵⸱
呥硴楬 ㄬ〷 ㄰⸳ ㌮ 〮 ㈮ ㄮ 〮 〮 ㄮ ㄮ 〮
䙯潤 㜱 ㄲ⸱ ㄮ ㈮ 〮 〮 〮 㜮 〮 〮 〮
䕬散瑬楣楴礠慮搠䝡 ㈬㘴 ㌮ 〮 〮 〮 ㄮ 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮
䱡湤⁔牡湳灯牴慴楯 ㄬ㈷ 㘮 〮 〮 ㌮ 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮
卨楰灩湧 㐷 ㄹ⸱ 〮 ㄵ⸶ 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮 ㈮
剥慬⁥獴慴攠慮搠睡牥桯畳 㘳 ㈱⸲ ㈮ ㄮ 㤮 ㌮ 〮 〮 ㄮ 〮 ㌮
䍯浭敲捥 ㈬㤲 㘮 㐮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮 〮
























































































































































































































































































晩牭 ㄹ㈲ ㄹ㌶ ㄹ㈲ⴳ ㄹ㈲ⴲ ㄹ㈷ⴳ ㄹ㌲ⴳ
呯瑡 ㄳ ㄹⰶ㜴 ㌹ⰷ㤹 㠮 ㄰⸹ 㜮 㠮
䙩湡湣 ㄵ ㈷ⰳ㐷 ㌷ⰲ㠱 㔮 ㄱ⸲ ⴱ⸱ 㜮
䵩湩湧 㐵ⰰ㈵ 㔵ⰸ㘰 㘮 㔮 㔮 㜮
䵥瑡 ㄸⰹ〶 ㈱ⰳ㌹ 㐮 ㈮ ⴳ⸱ ㄵ⸵
䵡捨楮敲 ㄰ ㄹⰵ㈵ ㌷ⰳㄵ 㘮 ㄰⸴ ⴰ⸲ 㤮
䍨敭楣慬 ㄰ⰰ〸 ㌱ⰷㄵ 㤮 㠮 㠮 ㄳ⸱
偡灥 ㌱ⰵ〰 ㄸ㜬㐹 ㄳ⸱ ㄶ⸴ ㄱ⸷ ㄱ⸴
䍥牡浩捳 㠬㜰 ㌲ⰹ㌳ ㄰⸹ ㄴ⸶ 㠮 ㄰⸱
呥硴楬 ㄴ ㄵⰴ㈰ ㈸ⰱ㜲 ㄱ⸶ ㄳ⸵ ㄰⸰ ㄱ⸴
䙯潤 ㄹⰰ㘷 ㌵ⰷ㠵 ㄲ⸹ ㄵ⸷ 㜮 ㄵ⸳
䕬散瑬楣楴礠慮搠䝡 ㌳ ㈰ⰷ㌵ 㘰ⰵ㜸 ㄰⸷ ㄱ⸸ ㄱ⸴ 㠮
䱡湤⁔牡湳灯牴慴楯 ㈱ 㤬㠲 ㈴ⰰ㘴 㠮 ㄰⸳ 㠮 㘮
卨楰灩湧 ㌱ⰱ㈵ ㌴ⰴ㜵 㐮 㔮 ㌮ ㈮
剥慬⁥獴慴攠慮搠睡牥桯畳 ㌲ⰰ〰 ㌵ⰳ㔰 ㄰⸶ ㄴ⸳ 㠮 㠮




























晩牭 ㄹ㈲ ㄹ㌶ ㄹ㈲ⴳ ㄹ㈲ⴲ ㄹ㈷ⴳ ㄹ㌲ⴳ
呯瑡 ㌰ ㈵ⰶ㘶 ㌸ⰶ㔴 㠮 ㄰⸲ 㔮 㤮
䙩湡湣 ㌷ⰵ〰 㘴ⰰ㔰 ㄱ⸲ ㄳ⸵ 㤮 ㄰⸷
䵩湩湧 㔴ⰸ㜵 㘷ⰴ㌳ 㠮 㘮 㜮 ㄱ⸰
䵥瑡 ㈰ⰸ㌳ ㄸⰳ㌳ ㈮ ㈮ ⴴ⸹ ㄰⸴
䵡捨楮敲 ㄱⰹ㔸 ㈷ⰰ〰 㠮 㤮 㐮 ㄱ⸴
䍨敭楣慬 㠬㐳 ㈱ⰲ㔰 ㄳ⸵ ㄴ⸲ 㠮 ㄸ⸳
偡灥 腣 腣 腣 腣 腣 腣
䍥牡浩捳 ㄲⰳ㘳 㐴ⰳ㈳ ㄰⸶ ㄴ⸷ 㠮 㠮
呥硴楬 腣 腣 腣 腣 腣 腣
䙯潤 腣 腣 腣 腣 腣 腣
䕬散瑬楣楴礠慮搠䝡 ㄴⰰ〰 ㌴ⰶ㠷 ㄱ⸱ ㄳ⸱ ㄰⸸ 㤮
䱡湤⁔牡湳灯牴慴楯 腣 腣 腣 腣 腣 腣
卨楰灩湧 㔸ⰰ〰 㘴ⰲ㔰 ㌮ ㌮ ㈮ 㐮
剥慬⁥獴慴攠慮搠睡牥桯畳 㐳ⰳ㌳ 㐷ⰵ〰 㤮 㤮 㤮 㤮





䍯湳瑡湴 ㄰⸵㔹 ⠷⸰〱⨪ 㐮㌱ ⠱⸶㤳
䍁偉呁 ⴰ⸰ㄹ ⠭ㄮ㠷㘩 ⴰ⸰㈵ ⠭㈮㐹〩 ⨪
婁䥂䅔单 ⴰ⸲㌳ ⠭〮㈵㜩 ㌮㘵 ⠳⸱㈵⨪




















⠱ ⠲ ⠳ ⠴ ⠵ ⠶
䍯湳瑡湴 㤮㌸ ⠲㔮ㄵ㈩ ⨪ ㈮㌶ ⠱⸸㤴 㜮〹 ⠲⸸ㄴ⨪ ㄮ㈸ ⠰⸲〴 㤮㠵 ⠱㐮㘳㤩 ⨪ 〮㈵ ⠰⸱㜴
䍁偉呁 ⴰ⸰ㄱ⠭㈮ㄶ㜩 ⨪ ⴰ⸰ㄹ⠭㌮㘶㔩 ⨪ ⴰ⸰㌲⠭ㄮ㈳㔩 ⴰ⸰㐳⠭ㄮ㔸㠩 ⴰ⸰ㄱ⠭ㄮ㜳㔩 ⴰ⸰ㄶ⠭㈮㜰㤩 ⨪
婁䥂䅔单 ⴰ⸶〱⠭ㄮㄱ㠩 ㈮㔰 ⠳⸷〶⨪ ⴱ⸵㐲⠭〮㘱㈩ 㔮㈶ ⠱⸶ㄸ ㄮ㔴 ⠲⸳㐹⨪ ㌮㘸 ⠴⸷㠴⨪
䥎䑕協剙 䙩湡湣 㔮㔴 ⠴⸱㤱⨪ ⴳ⸷ㄹ⠭〮㔱㌩ 㜮㜶 ⠵⸱㐵⨪
䵩湩湧 㐮㌰ ⠲⸷㈴⨪ ㈮ㄴ ⠰⸲㠰 㜮〰 ⠳⸸㠰⨪
䵥瑡 ㌮㠴 ⠲⸳ㄹ⨪ ⴹ⸰〷⠭ㄮㄲ㌩ ㄳ⸸〷 ⠷⸲㤴⨪
䵡捨楮敲 ㌮㘱 ⠲⸶㔰⨪ ⴴ⸲㌷⠭〮㘴〩 㠮㘳 ⠵⸵㐶⨪
䍨敭楣慬 㠮㔱 ⠵⸵㔸⨪ 㔮㈳ ⠰⸷〸 ㄲ⸹㠷 ⠷⸴㌰⨪
偡灥 ㄱ⸰〷 ⠳⸹㐰⨪ ㄱ⸳㈲ ⠰⸸㐵 ㄳ⸹㘶 ⠴⸳㐱⨪
䍥牡浩捳 㔮㘳 ⠳⸱ㄲ⨪ ㌮㈰ ⠰⸳㘶 㠮㠶 ⠴⸲㤱⨪
呥硴楬 㤮㘲 ⠶⸸㜷⨪ 㠮㐶 ⠱⸲㔲 ㄲ⸵㌵ ⠷⸸㐸⨪
䙯潤 㤮㠶 ⠶⸵ㄳ⨪ 㘮㔳 ⠰⸸㤴 ㄶ⸵㔶 ⠹⸵㜴⨪
䕬散瑬楣楴礠慮搠䝡 㤮〳 ⠶⸸㜵⨪ ㄰⸶㔷 ⠱⸶㠳 ㄰⸳㐷 ⠶⸸㠰⨪
䱡湤⁔牡湳灯牴慴楯 㔮㘲 ⠴⸱㜶⨪ 㘮㤷 ⠱⸰㜲 㜮ㄳ ⠴⸶㐲⨪
卨楰灩湧 ㄮ〰 ⠰⸶㈰ ㄮ㐰 ⠰⸱㠰 ㌮㈲ ⠱⸷㐶
䍯浭敲捥 㐮㔲 ⠲⸸㜳⨪ 㐮ㄱ ⠰⸵㐱 㘮㌹ ⠳⸵㘰⨪














呯歹漠䙩牥 ㄸ㤶 ㄸ㠷 奡獵摡
䡯歫慩摯⁃潡氠䵩湥⁡湤⁓桩灰楮 ㄸ㤹 ㄸ㠹 䵩瑳畩
卨楫潫甠䉡湫 ㄹ〷 ㄸ㤶 奡獵摡
䍨畧潫甠剡楬睡楹 ㄹ〹 ㄸ㤶 奡獵摡
䭹畳桵⁃潡氠䵩湥⁡湤⁓桩灰楮 ㄹㄱ ㄹ〷 䵩瑳畢楳桩
䭥楨楮⁃慮慬 ㄹ㈰ ㄹㄷ 䅳慮
乩桯渠偡灥爠䥮摵獴特 ㄹ㈲ ㄹㄳ 奡獵摡
乩桯渠䍨畹愠䉡湫 ㄹ㈲ ㄸ㤸 奡獵摡
䑡楳慮⁂慮 ㄹ㈳ ㄸ㤵 奡獵摡
䥺畬愠䵩湩湧 ㄹ㈴ ㄹㄸ 䵩瑳畢楳桩
卵浩瑯浯⁌楦攠䥮獵牡湣 ㄹ㈵ ㄹ〷 卵浩瑯浯
呯歹漠却敥 ㄹ㈶ ㄹㄷ 䵩瑳畢楳桩
乩桯渠䙬潵爠䵩汬 ㄹ㈸ ㄸ㤶 䵩瑳畩
久 ㄹ㌲ ㄸ㤹 卵浩瑯浯
乩桯渠䙩獨敲 ㄹ㌴ ㄹ㈵ 乩獳慮
乩桯渠䙡 ㄹ㌴ ㄹ㈱ 乩獳慮
佳慫愠䵡湵晡捴畲楮 ㄹ㌴ ㄹㄳ 乩獳慮
乩桯渠䍨敭楣慬⁉湤畳瑲 ㄹ㌷ ㄹ㌴ 乩獳慮













ㄹ㈲ ㈱ⰰ㌶ 㜮 ⴳ⸵
ㄹ㈳ ㈲ⰰ㌲ 㐮 ⴴ⸳
ㄹ㈴ ㈳ⰱ㐱 㔮 ⴵ⸹
ㄹ㈵ ㈶ⰳ㐹 ㄳ⸹ ㌮
ㄹ㈶ ㌵ⰷ㘸 ㌵⸷ ㈹⸴
ㄹ㈷ 㔰ⰶ㠱 㐱⸷ ㌶⸳
ㄹ㈸ 㜴ⰴ㐱 㐶⸹ ㌶⸴
ㄹ㈹ 㤸ⰵ〵 ㌲⸳ ㄷ⸰
ㄹ㌰ ㄱ㤬㐴 ㈱⸳ 㜮
ㄹ㌱ ㄴ㈬㠵 ㄹ⸶ 㜮
ㄹ㌲ ㄶ㤬㐷 ㄸ⸶ ㄰⸲
ㄹ㌳ ㈱㔬㐳 ㈷⸱ ㄲ⸵
ㄹ㌴ ㈷㈬㠲 ㈶⸶ 㤮
ㄹ㌵ ㌵㜬㌱ ㌱⸰ ㄳ⸶
























ㄹ㈲ ㌰〰 ㈮ ⴵ⸰
ㄹ㈳ ㌰〰 㔮 ⴰ⸲
ㄹ㈴ ㈰〰 㘮 㐮
ㄹ㈵ ㈰〰 ⴹ⸵ ⴸ⸲
ㄹ㈶ 㐰 ⴰ⸵ ㄮ
ㄹ㈷ 㐰 ⴰ⸴ ㌮
ㄹ㈸ 㐰 ⴱ⸰ 〮
ㄹ㈹ 㐰 〮 ⴰ⸲
ㄹ㌰ 㐰 ⴱ㐮 ⴱㄮ
ㄹ㌱ 㐰 ⴸ㐮 ⴷ㔮
ㄹ㌲ 㐰 ㄵ⸰ 㔮
ㄹ㌳ ㄰〰 㐸⸵ ㈷⸹
ㄹ㌴ ㈰〰 㐰⸹ ㈳⸳
ㄹ㌵ ㈰〰 ㄹ⸲ ㌮





呡歡祯獨椠䵵牡浡瑳 㔮 䥳慪椠䕮摯 㠴⸳䵩瑳畢楳桩⁉牯渠坯牫 㠰⸰
奵橩牯⁈慹慳桩祡 ㈮ 呥楪楲漠䵡瑳畤 ㄮ 呥楪楲漠䵡瑳畤 㘮
䡩牯獨椠呡湫敩 ㈮ 䭡橩獨楲漠䙵湡歯獨 ㄮ 䭡橩獨楲漠䙵湡歯獨 ㄮ
呡摡獨楣桩⁉湡浯瑯 ㄮ 䝹漠䭡睡浵牡 ㄮ 卨楧敭楣桩⁍楹潳桩 ㄮ
呯歵橩牯⁉湡浯瑯 ㄮ 乵楳桩牯⁆畫畳桩浡 ㄮ 䝹漠䭡睡浵牡 ㄮ
呡摡桩牯⁔慫敵捨 ㄮ 剹潳畫攠奡浡穡歩 ㄮ 乵楳桩牯⁆畫畳桩浡 ㄮ
卨楮瑡牯⁓畺畫 ㄮ 䭡浥瑡牯⁍慴獵浵牡 ㄮ 併⁆番業畲 ㄮ
奵穯⁍慴獵摡 ㄮ 䭡浥瑡牯⁍慴獵浵牡 ㄮ
呯牡獨楣桩⁔慫慨慳桩ㄮ 乯物漠䅫畴獵 ㄮ






卵穵歩⁓桯瑥 ㄳ⸱卵穵歩⁓桯瑥 㜲⸸䵩瑳畩…⁃漮 㘰⸱
䡡牵湯獵步⁔慮 㐮 䭡瑳番椠卩浯歡睡 ㈮ 䍨楫畨敩⁎慫慪業 ㄮ
䅮摯⁋潢敩⁓桯瑥 ㈮ 乯摡⁓潹⁓慵捥 〮 䭯獨楲漠乩獨橭畲 〮
䡩牡扥椠䡩牡湯 ㈮ 䡩獡湯獵步⁍慴獵獨楴 〮 乯摡⁓潹⁓慵捥 〮
卥楳桩捨椠䥷慳慫 ㈮ 䡡橩浥⁍慴獵 〮 䥷慳慫椠卥楳桩捨椠卨潴敮 〮
䭵物桡牡⁒楣 ㈮ 䥣桩穯⁏湩獨 〮 呯楣桩⁎慫慭畲 〮
乯摡⁓潹⁓慵捥 ㈮ 卨潩捨椠䭡睡湩獨 〮 卨楮楣桩⁁祡 〮
䭯浡歩捨椠䭵扯瑡 ㈮ 䭯浡歩捨椠䭵扯瑡 〮 奯桳桩桩摥⁏瑡 〮
卯獨楲漠佫慤 ㄮ 呯歵瑡牯⁈慲 〮 奯獪桩橩⁎慫慪業 〮
















瑨潵獡湤⁹敮┯祥慲 ┯祥慲 ┯祥慲 祥 祥
ㄹ㈲ 㔬㘲 ㄰⸰ ⴲ⸷ ⴱㄮ 㐲⸷ 㠵⸶
ㄹ㈳ 㘬㠱 㤮 ⴷ⸸ ⴹ⸱ 㐰⸷ ㄰ㄮ
ㄹ㈴ 㠬㈹ ㄳ⸳ ⴶ⸷ ⴱㄮ 㐴⸰ 㤹⸸
ㄹ㈵ 㠬㌹ ㄲ⸶ ⴲ⸹ ⴸ⸴ 㔳⸶ ㄰㐮
ㄹ㈶ ㄰ⰷ㈰ ⴷ㘮 ⴹ〮 ⴹㄮ 㐷⸸ 㤹⸳
ㄹ㈷ ㄱⰰ㜵 ⴱ㔴⸱ ⴱ㜰⸵ ⴱ㘸⸵ ㄲ⸷ 㤱⸵
ㄹ㈸ ㄱⰰ㜵 〮 ⴱ⸸ ⴱ㐮 ꖥ ㄰㌮
ㄹ㈹ ㌬㤳 㜮 〮 ⴷ⸷ 㔵⸵ 㠸⸸
ㄹ㌰ ㌬㤳 㤮 ㌮ ⴳ⸶ 㐰⸳ 㜵⸵
ㄹ㌱ ㌬㤳 ㄱ⸰ 㔮 ⴰ⸹ 㐱⸹ 㜹⸱
ㄹ㌲ ㌬㤳 ㈰⸲ 㤮 㠮 㔹⸰ 㠵⸶
ㄹ㌳ ㌬㤳 ㈵⸲ ㄱ⸵ ㄲ⸱ 㜱⸲ 㠳⸲
ㄹ㌴ 㔬㤵 ㄳ⸱ ⴲ⸲ ㄮ 㘹⸲ 㜸⸷
ㄹ㌵ 㜬㤶 ㄷ⸷ ⴰ⸱ ㈮ 㜶⸳ 㜶⸸
























瑨潵獡湤⁹敮 ┯祥慲 ┯祥慲 ┯祥慲
ㄹ㈴ ㄰ⰰ〰 ㈴⸴ ㄴ⸳ ㄲ⸲
ㄹ㈵ ㄰ⰰ〰 ㌰⸲ ㈰⸲ ㄸ⸷
ㄹ㈶ ㄲⰵ〰 ㈶⸸ ㄷ⸵ ㄶ⸸
ㄹ㈷ ㄵⰰ〰 ㈰⸷ ㈲⸸ ㄳ⸴
ㄹ㈸ ㄵⰰ〰 ㄴ⸷ ㄰⸴ 㘮
ㄹ㈹ ㄷⰵ〰 ㄲ⸳ 㐮 㐮
ㄹ㌰ ㄷⰵ〰 㜮 ㈮ ⴱ⸴
ㄹ㌱ ㄷⰵ〰 㐮 㐮 ㌮
ㄹ㌲ ㄷⰵ〰 㐮 ㈮ ㄮ
ㄹ㌳ ㄲⰵ〰 ㄰⸵ ㄮ ⴱ⸷
ㄹ㌴ ㄲⰵ〰 ㄲ⸴ ㄮ ⴲ⸹
ㄹ㌵ ㄲⰵ〰 ㄴ⸳ ⴰ⸵ ⴳ⸵






䵩瑳畩…⁃漮 㔮 卵浩瑯浯⁇潳桩 㤮
䑡楲潫甠䍯潰敲慴楯 㔮 䵩瑳畩…⁃漮 㔮
卵浩瑯浯⁃慢汥 㔮 䑡楲潫甠䍯潰敲慴楯 㔮
䑡楩捨椠䱩晥⁉湳畲慮捥㐮 卵浩瑯浯⁃慢汥 㐮
䙹浩⁍慥摡 ㄮ 䑡楩捨椠䱩晥⁉湳畲慮捥 㐮
䵩瑳畩⁕捨楹慭 ㄮ 䙹浩⁍慥摡 ㄮ
䡩獡桩瑯⁍慳番業 ㄮ 䵩瑳畩⁕捨楹慭 ㄮ
䵩捨椠䭯橩浡 ㄮ 䡩獡桩瑯⁍慳番業 ㄮ
㄰ 䅩歯歵⁌楦攠䥮獵牡湣 ㄮ 䵩捨椠䭯橩浡 ㄮ
卯畲捥㨠卨慲敨潬摥爠䱩獴⁯映久䌮